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Abstract 
The optimal provision of free vs. paid information is a key decision for information 
sellers. Utilizing a dataset from a large online investment advisory platform, we 
construct and empirically estimate a structural model of demand and supply in a 
competitive information market. We model demand for paid information as a two-stage 
process where heterogeneous information seekers first sample free information subject 
to their attentional constraints in order to form a consideration set and then make their 
purchase decisions. Consequently, strategic information sellers can provide free 
information to influence the demand elasticities and market structure in the market of 
paid information. Our paper contributes to the literature by documenting the interplay 
between seller competition and consumers’ limited attention in the context of information 
selling. Our results also guide information sellers to determine the optimal quantity of 
free vs. paid information. 
Keywords:  Information Selling, Limited Attention, Seller Competition, Structural Model,  
Online Investment Advisory Platform 
Introduction 
Information is critical to decision making (Shannon 2001). As a result of the digitalization of markets, 
information selling activities, such as consulting, advertising, and data broking, are increasingly more 
relevant to economic activities and welfares (Bergemann and Bonatti 2018). Oftentimes, information 
products are divisible at minimal costs (Shannon 2001). Thus, information sellers are able to offer some 
information for free to attract consumers and sell the remainder to maximize profits. As an example, when 
launching its famous paywall in 2011, the New York Times (NYT) allowed visitors to read up to 10 free news 
articles per month before asking them to become paid subscribers (Peters 2011). 
The provision of free vs. paid information by a content publisher is important and has non-trivial profit 
impacts. Free information can attract more consumers, but it is costly to provide and can affect demand 
elasticities in the paid markets (Grossman and Shapiro 1984). Practitioners, therefore, are constantly 
experimenting with the optimal quantity of free vs. paid information. In late 2017, NYT halved the article 
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limit from 10 to 5 (Smith 2017), in its attempt to capitalize on its record-high subscriber base, nearing 2.5 
million and a 59 percent increase over the previous year. Recently, NYT planned to adopt a flexible paywall 
that enables price-sensitive cohorts of users to have different article limits (Moses 2018), a model that its 
competitors, such as the Wall Street Journal and Hearst Newspapers, have already adopted.  
Many information markets (e.g., newspapers, consulting) consist of more than one seller and involve a 
certain degree of competition. While a growing number of theoretical research has examined a monopoly 
seller’s information selling strategy, relatively little is known about the implications of market competition 
among information sellers. Moreover, previous work has recognized that a consumer’s attention is limited 
(Manzini and Mariotti 2014; Stango and Zinman 2014), such that the inattention may result from 
exogenous or physical constraints, or emerge endogenously from consumers’ optimization behaviors. 
Consumer inattention has also been shown to impact the equilibrium in competitive information sending 
games (Anderson and de Palma 2012; Iyer and Katona 2015). Yet, the empirical modeling of consumers’ 
limited attention and its implication for information selling strategies are left unexplored.  
Motivated above by the gaps in research and the relevance to business practices, we ask these questions:  
RQ1: How does competition affect the equilibrium quantity of free vs. paid information in a competitive 
information market?  
RQ2: How does consumers’ limited attention for free information affect seller strategies in a competitive 
information market?  
To address our research questions, we take an empirical approach and construct a structural model of 
information market. On the demand side, we model an information seeker’s decision to sample free 
information from information sellers and his decision to upgrade from a free visitor to a paid subscriber. 
Motivated by both previous literature and empirical patterns in our dataset, our demand model 
incorporates the aforementioned important feature in information markets, namely, consumers’ limited 
attention. An information seeker with attentional constraint is able to sample a limited set of information 
sellers, which forms the consideration set for the information seeker’s future subscription (i.e., paying) 
decision. In this setup, free information can be used strategically to affect the demand elasticities and 
market structure in the paid information market. Our baseline supply model is a static quantity game where 
sellers compete in setting quantities of both free and paid information. In an extension, we consider a 
dynamic game where sellers’ current quantity decisions affect their future profits because of consumers’ 
accumulating “goodwill.” We obtain unique data of information sellers and seekers from an online 
investment advisory platform (IAP) and estimate our model using Simulated Method of Moments. 
Our study can contribute to the academic literature and business practice in the following manners. First, 
our study enriches our understanding of information selling strategies by documenting the linkage between 
seller competition and consumers’ limited attention. We expect that with consumers being attentionally 
constrained, information sellers can be better off, as they could reduce the competition in the paid 
information market by producing more free information to “drain” consumers’ attention. Second, moving 
beyond investigating the adoption decision of a paid content business model, we advance the content 
monetization literature by showing the optimal quantity of free vs. paid content. Third, our study offers 
unique managerial implications on the strategic use of free information to maximize paid information 
revenue. These implications are of great relevance to industries characterized by giving away certain 
information for free, including online newspapers, knowledge sharing and monetization platforms, digital 
music distribution services, to name a few. 
Literature Review 
Information Market 
Our research is related to several streams of literatures on the information market. Most relevant to our 
work is the recent growing literature on information selling in economics (Bergemann and Bonatti 2018). 
Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016) show that giving away part of the information and selling the remainder in 
dribs and drabs can arise endogenously as an optimal information selling strategy due to quality uncertainty. 
Bergemann et al. (2018) show that with heterogeneous buyers, sellers will benefit from selling the 
information products at different prices and qualities. Our work builds on their insight that information 
product is divisible and can be packaged at a minimal cost. We empirically explore the implications of seller 
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competition on equilibrium seller strategies. We use quantity as opposed to price as a firm’s strategic 
variable to fit our context. Our work also relates to the existing literature on freemium vs. premium business 
models for monopoly firms (Cheng and Liu 2012; Niculescu and Wu 2014). Focusing on the informational 
role of free products, we estimate a structural model of demand and supply in a competitive market and 
quantifies the impact of freemium strategies on equilibrium profit.  
Our treatment of free information is similar to the informative advertising technology introduced by Butters 
(1977). In a differentiated product market, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) show that free information (i.e., 
advertising) can improve the match of consumers and product but increase the elasticity of demand. We 
incorporate these tradeoffs in our model and estimate an empirical model using data from an IAP. Our 
demand model relates to consumer search and consideration set formation in the marketing and economics 
literature. Abaluck and Adams (2019) consider theoretically an identification problem of limited attention 
using only choice data. Chen and Yao (2017) estimate a structural model of search using clickstream data. 
Unlike them, we focus on the supply side and abstract away from a rational search framework by adopting 
a parsimonious model of consideration set formation (Cattaneo et al. 2019).  
Content Monetization 
Our study is also related to the emerging content monetization literature. The prevailing view that “Internet 
should be free for everyone” makes monetizing online content very challenging (Cannon 2014). In recent 
years, various online content businesses are experimenting with paid content business models (e.g., paywall 
in the newspaper industry (Peters 2011)). Research has also investigated the impact and design of the paid 
content business models. For instance, Pauwels and Weiss (2008) study the short- and long-term impacts 
of adopting a paid content model on readership loss, and how marketing actions reduce such losses. Oh et 
al. (2016) examine NYT’s use of a paywall and find that it results in a longer tail for the word-of-mouth 
(WOM) of NYT’s articles on Twitter. Pattabhiramaiah et al. (2019) examine the impact of newspapers’ 
online paywalls on reader engagement and its spillover effect on the print business.  
Our study deviates from the above papers in substantive ways. First, we study dynamic competition among 
content providers (i.e., information sellers), which is mentioned by prior studies but not yet explicitly 
analyzed. Second, unlike the prior studies which tend to drive implications from studying the adoption of 
the paid content business model, our study examines the optimal quantity strategy of free vs. paid content. 
This fine-grained research angle is more relevant to real-life actionable business practices (e.g., flexible 
paywall (Moses 2018)) and has the potential to garner deeper managerial insights.  
Data  
Data Context 
Information is the most sought-after product in the financial world. We situate our study in the context of 
IAP, which primarily relies on social media advisors (SMAs), either certified or amateur advisors, to 
contribute online investment advisory information to investors. We collected our data from a China-based 
IAP, iMaibo, which currently has more than 4 million registered users. iMaibo is similar to StockTwits and 
follows a Twitter-style content structure. Once an iMaibo user follows another iMaibo user, the latter’s 
generated content will be shown in the former’s timeline in a reverse chronological order. At the same time, 
there is a separate section for an iMaibo user to view the latest, trending, or editor-picked content, so that 
the user can be exposed to the content from the SMAs whom he has not followed.  
In our context, SMAs are information sellers and investors are information seekers. The information the 
sellers offer is mainly about real-time news, analysis and investment advice for the Chinese stock market. 
Sellers can publish both free and paid tweets (i.e., the free and paid information in our study) to seekers. A 
seeker can visit a seller to consume free tweets. iMaibo adopts a subscription model for paid tweets. Thus, 
to consume the paid tweets of a seller, the seeker needs to subscribe to the seller on a daily, monthly or 
quarterly basis. Subscription fees are paid to the sellers and shared with iMaibo.  
We construct a monthly dataset of sellers and seekers in iMaibo spanning 2 years from June 1, 2014, to 
June 1, 2016. We use the top 100 sellers, which account for 81% of the total content production and 99.8 of 
the paid tweet productions. The data contains information about the tweets, the subscription payment 
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records, the clickstream of seekers, etc. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables in our 
unbalanced panel data about the 100 sellers across 1,351 observations.  
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min Max 
nFree Number of free tweets produced in a month 262.76 306.57 0 1818 
nPaid Number of paid tweets produced in a month 77.03 244.27 0 2531 
nVisitor Number of unique visitors in a month 16276.16 38308.71 0 357145 
nSubscriber Number of daily and monthly subscribers in a month 569.77 2600.42 0 28305 
Price Average 1-day subscription fee of a seller in a month (¥) 22 32.77 0 100 
nFollower The number of followers of a seller in a month 29355.37 82599.23 0 665498 
Model-free Evidence 
Here, we highlight notable features of our data, which motivate our structural model in the next section.  
  
  
Figure 1 Seeker Visits and 
Subscriptions 
Figure 2 Number of Tweets 
Read by Seekers 
Figure 3 Seller Information 
Selling 
Figure 4 Seeker i’s 
Decision Process 
The star-shaped points in Figure 1 show that 54% of seekers visit 1 seller in a day, while 18.3% and 9.4% 
visit 2 and 3 sellers. Clearly, seekers tend to visit only a small set of sellers. The triangle-shaped points in 
Figure 1 show that across the tenure of seekers on the platform, 92% of them only subscribe to just 1 seller. 
Figure 2 shows two sharp declines or discontinuities (at 1 and 15) in the daily number of tweets read by a 
seeker (i.e., the number of tweets generated by the sellers visited by the seeker). The two discontinuities in 
the tweet reading plot suggest the existence of limited attention (Lacetera et al. 2012). These data patterns 
motivate us to model seeker behaviors such that, subject to the attentional constraint, a seeker visits (i.e., 
sample) a limited set of sellers in a day and choose one of them to subscribe to. 
Figure 3 shows the aggregate trend of paid tweet percentage as the tenure of a seller increases. There is a 
clear upward trend: a seller tends to produce more free tweets in the beginning period of his stay in iMaibo, 
and gradually increase and calibrate the percentage of paid tweets afterward. Columns 1-2 of Table 2 further 
show how the number of free and paid tweets of a seller influence the number of visitors and subscribers of 
the seller (both seller and month fixed effects are controlled in Table 2). 
From Column 1 of Table 2, we find that the number of free tweets of a seller has a significant and positive 
effect on the number of visitors to the seller. On the contrary, the effect of the number of paid tweets is not 
significant. This demonstrates that the number of free tweets is a more important decision factor for a 
seeker’s visiting decision. Also, in Column 3, the lag term of the number of free tweets is significant too, 
implying seekers may take the past free tweets of the seller into consideration as well. By comparison, the 
number of paid tweets has a significant positive impact on the number of subscribers, while the effect of the 
number of free tweets is not significant (see Column 2). This shows that a seeker upgrades from a free visitor 
to a paid subscriber primarily because the seller produces more paid tweets. We include more control 
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variables into the model as shown in Column 3 and Column 4 to demonstrate the robustness of our results. 
The results are qualitatively the same to those in Column 1 and Column 2. The above findings serve as 
empirical supports to the premise of our model: information sellers use the quantity of free information to 
attract visitors and then the quantity of paid information to increase the subscribers base. 
Table 2 Regressions  
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
 nVisitor nSubscriber nVisitor nSubscriber nFree nPaid 
nFree 23.362*** 0.097 18.123*** 0.232   
nFree_Lag   9.274**    
nPaid 4.204 3.693*** -5.612 3.808***   
Price   -19.621 -10.953**   
nVisitor_Lag     0.001*** 0.0001 
nSubscriber_Lag   -0.174  0.002 0.012*** 
nFollower   -0.013 0.003   
Observations 1,351 1,351 1,251 1,351 1,251 1,251 
R2 0.035 0.139 0.035 0.132 0.025 0.035 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Model 
Here, we develop a structural model. Consider a market with J information sellers. Each seller, indexed by 
j, offers information (e.g., stock market information in the form of tweets) to information seekers for time 
periods t=1,...,T. We assume that a seller generates homogenous information across time, that is, we allow 
the quality of paid information to be different from that of free information as long as the quality difference 
is persistent across time within a given information seller. We define a period as one month. At each time 
t, a seller generates nFree pieces of free information and nPaid pieces of paid information.  
Demand Side 
We use tM to denote all the information seekers in period t. We assume that in every period, information 
seeker i ( ti M ) makes a two-stage decision, as shown in Figure 4. Seeker i first decides whether to become 
a (free) visitor of seller j (visiting process). We use a binary logit model for this stage. Notably, seeker i can 
visit or sample multiple sellers. We denote all the possible combination of sellers by tC  and the set of sellers 
that seeker i has sampled in period t by itN  ( it tN C ). Seeker i then decides on which seller in itN  to 
subscribe to (subscribing decision). We use a multinomial logit model for this stage. The visiting process is 
essentially the consideration set formation process for future subscription decisions (Terui et al. 2011). 
Based on Table 2’s findings, the visiting process is influenced by the amount of free information, while the 
subscription decision is primarily determined by the amount of paid information.  
Visiting process. Information seeker i’s utility from visiting information seller j in period t is: 
          0 1 2ijt ijt ij i jt i ijt t jtijt ijtG H nFree isFollower  (1) 
where 0ij is information seeker i’s intrinsic preference for visiting information seller j. 1i is the coefficient 
for the amount of free information.  2i accounts for the influence of the information structure (i.e., whether 
i is a follower of j). t is the month trend, accounting for the exogenous time shock. jt is the unobserved (to 
researchers) information seller attributes. The above effects are allowed to vary across information seekers 
to account for heterogeneity. More specifically, 
0
2
0 0~ ( , )ij jN    , 1
2
1 1 ,( )~i N    , and    22
2
2 ( , )~i N . In 
theory, we could specify a variance-covariance matrix for 0ij , which can reveal the substitution pattern of 
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the sellers. However, as we have 100 information sellers, such a large matrix is computationally infeasible 
to estimate. We leave the task of a more flexible specification for future work.  
We assume that ijt follow an extreme value distribution, which gives rise to the following logit choice 
probability of information seeker i visiting information seller j in period t:  
 

exp( )
1 exp( )
ijt
ijt
ijt
H
s
H
 (2) 
The seeker’s visiting decision is linked to a seller’s number of visitors by connecting the seeker’s visiting 
probability to the seller’s market share (Berry et al. 1995). The unconditional probability of visiting seller j 
is obtained after integrating out consumer heterogeneity (
10
2 2( , )f    is the joint density of 0
2
 and 1
2
 ): 
     10
2 2( , )jt ijts s df  (3) 
If information seekers have infinite attention, the number of visitors that information seller j has in period 
t is simply  *jt t jtnVisitor M s . In this situation, there is virtually no competition in the market of free 
information. Next, we formally introduce the concept of limited attention (Cattaneo et al. 2019), which 
enables sellers to compete in the market of free information. We denote the attentional constraint of seeker 
i by iA ( 0 iA   ). Thus, the probability of seeker i having a consideration set tF ( t tF C ) is, 
 
/,
1
( ) (1 )
t t t
it t kt k
k F F k
t
k J FJ
P N F s s
   
     w.r.t 
t
i
k J
ktnFree A

  (4) 
/,
1 (1 )
tt
kt
k
J
F k J F
s
 
   represents the probability that seeker i considers no alternatives in J , which is used 
to adjust each probability so that the sum is 1 (Manzini and Mariotti 2014). jtC (
j
t tC C ) is the subset that 
contains seller j. Seller j’s number of visitors1 in period t is 

  )* * (
j
t t
jt t jt t
CF
nVisitor M s P F . 
The above specification of limited attention is consistent with the theoretical models in Manzini and 
Mariotti (2014) and Cattaneo et al. (2019). We highlight here how a seller’s free information influences a 
seeker’s visiting (or consideration set formation process for subscription decisions). By providing more free 
information, the seller essentially shrinks the remaining attention of the seeker. With reduced remaining 
attention, the seeker will visit less other sellers and then have fewer sellers (i.e., smaller consideration set) 
to consider for his subscription decision. As such, by providing more free information, the information 
seller can reduce the number of competitors he will face in the paid information market.  
Subscription decision. Conditional on itN , information seeker i’s subscription decision becomes a 
multinomial choice problem2. Seeker i’s utility from subscribing to information seller j in period t is: 
             0 1 2 3| it ijt ijt ij i jt i jt iij ijt t jt ijttU N R Price nPaid isFollower , jtj N  (5) 
0ij is seeker i’s intrinsic preference for seller j’s paid information. 1i is the price coefficient (or marginal 
utility of income).  2i  is the coefficient for the effect of paid information.  3i accounts for the influence of 
the information structure. Again, we use random coefficients to account for consumer heterogeneity: 
0
2
0 0~ ( , )ij jN    , 1
2
1 1 ,( )~i N    , 22
2
2 ,~ ( )i N    and    33
2
3 ( ),~i N . 
                                                             
1 We estimate the demand model using individual seekers’ choice data. The discussions here about sellers’ 
nVisitor and nSubscriber (see next subsection) are to facilitate the development of the supply model. 
2 We do not consider the limited attention on paid tweets currently. As a consumer incurs a cost to consume 
paid tweets, the consumer may try to extract as much information as possible from paid tweets. Therefore, 
the limited attention assumption does not seem to fit the subscription decision. Nevertheless, our model 
can allow limited attention on the subscription decision, which will be explored in the future.  
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We assume an outside option ( 0j  ) and normalize its indirect utility to 0 0t ti iU . We assume that ijt
follow the extreme value distribution. The probability of subscribing to seller j (  ijj N ) is obtained after 
integrating out consumer heterogeneity (     10 0
2 2 2( , , )f is the joint distribution of  
0
2
 , 1
2
 , and 2
2
 ): 
   
  


  0 01
2 2 2
exp( )
| ( , , )
1 exp( )
it
ijt
ijt it
ikt
k N
R
h N df
R
 (6) 
Again, we link seekers’ subscription decision to the number of subscribers of a seller (nSubscriberjt). The 
unconditional probability of subscribing to seller j is ( )
t
j
t
jt jt t
F C
r h P F

    . Then,  *jt t jtnSubscriber M r .  
Supply Side 
Per-Period Profit. In our data, an average seller only adjusts his price 1.89 times during his tenure. As 
the average tenure duration is 13.51 months, it is clear that the key strategic decision for sellers is the 
quantity of free vs. paid information rather than pricing. We thus do not model the pricing decision here. 
We assume constant marginal costs, fc  and pc , for producing free and paid information. We denote the 
unobserved supply shocks by jt . The one period profit for information seller j is given as follows,  
 * ( * * )jt jt f jt p jt jtnSubscribers Price c nFree c nPaid       (8) 
Dynamics 
Till now, our model is static. We extend our static model by including dynamics. We first define a stock 
variable (i.e., “goodwill,” see Dubé et al. (2005)) for the free information that seller j produces, 
 
21
, 1 , 2* * *jt jt j t j tNFree nFree nFree nFree        (9) 
We then use NFree instead of nFree in the dynamic model (see the discussion in Model-free Evidence 
section about Column 3 of Table 2). We set the discount factor conventionally as 0.9  3. 
We move on to discuss the dynamic competition among information sellers. We use t and t to denote the 
vector of demand shocks of information seekers. Seller j’s information selling strategy is based on the 
expected profit function. Let tS denote the state vector of all information sellers in period t, then we have, 
 ( , , ) [ ] ( ) ( )jt t jt jt jt jt t tS nFree nPaid E dP dP       (10) 
Let ( , ):jt t jt jtnFree nPaidS  represent information seller j’s information selling strategy. We further use 
j to denote the vector of jt for all periods. Under a strategy profile 1{ , , }J   , which lists the 
information selling strategy of all sellers, the expected present value of information seller j’s total profits 
can be calculated by the following Bellman equation,  
 
,
, 1 1 1[ , ( )] | , (( | ) sup { ( | ) [ ]})
jt
jt t jt t jt t
nFree nPai
j t t
d
t t t jtSV S S V S SS dP S             (11) 
Essentially, seller j searches for the best response to j   that maximizes ( | )jt tSV   for any t. As we have 
100 sellers, Oblivious Equilibrium (OE) (Weintraub et al. 2008) is used to solve the game. OE proposes that 
with a large number of agents, simultaneous change in the states of individual agents can be averaged out 
because of the law of large numbers, which greatly simplifies the computation. 
Estimation 
We use Simulated Method of Moments to estimate the demand and supply models separately. Our demand 
model is estimated in two steps. First, we use the consumer clickstream data on free information sampling 
to estimate seekers’ consideration set formation process. Next, we use seekers’ subscription decisions to 
                                                             
3 We will evaluate other values: 0.95 (Huang 2019), 0.96, 0.99 (Dubé et al. 2005) or 1 (Kim et al. 2010).   
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identify their preference for paid information. For the identification of the demand-side parameters, we 
plan to use the propensity score matching (PSM) method to construct a matched sample of information 
seller-seeker pairs with everything about the sellers being equivalent except the quantity of information 
produced. With the demand-side parameters, we estimate sellers’ cost function under the assumption that 
quantity decisions are optimal. Here, we consider using Baidu Search Index for stock market-related terms 
to instrument for demand variables (i.e., number of visitors and subscribers), since the Index, as demand 
signals, should be correlated with demand variables but not with sellers’ cost.  
Preliminary Results for Information Selling  
Column 5 and 6 of Table 2 show how information sellers adjust the information selling strategy when the 
demand changes in the previous period. We find that nVisitor and nSubscriber are positive and significant 
in the equation of nFree and nPaid, respectively, while other effects are not significant. Thus, an 
information seller produces more free (paid) information to respond to the increased number of visitors 
(subscribers) from the previous period, perhaps hoping to obtain even more visitors (subscribers). However, 
because of uncontrolled competition and seller optimization behaviors, the above interpretation does not 
have the luxury of causality. This motivates us to estimate a structural model of the dynamic competition 
between information sellers, which enables counterfactual experiments with more insights. 
Contributions and Conclusion 
The optimal provision of free vs. paid information is a key decision for information sellers. Using the data 
from an IAP for investment information, we build a structural model for information sellers’ selling strategy 
and information seekers’ visiting and subscription decisions. Our model features both the dynamic 
competition among information sellers and the limited attention of information seekers. 
Our study enriches the information selling literature (Bergemann et al. 2018; Hörner and Skrzypacz 2016) 
by documenting the interplay between the limited attention (Manzini and Mariotti 2014; Stango and 
Zinman 2014) of information seekers and the information selling strategy of competitive sellers. We expect 
that information sellers may actually benefit from consumers’ limited attention. This is because consumers’ 
attentional constraint may soften seller competition in the paid information market. On the other hand, 
inattentive consumers may be worse off because excessive free information resulting from seller 
competition may lower the match of consumers and products. 
Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on online content monetization. Prior studies tend to 
study how the implementation of paid content business model influences issues such as readership loss 
(Pauwels and Weiss 2008), consumer engagement (Kim and Song 2019; Pattabhiramaiah et al. 2019), and 
WoM (Oh et al. 2016). Our study advances the current literature by taking a more granular research angle 
and unraveling the optimal quantity allocation of free and paid content.  
Finally, our study offers significant managerial implications to the businesses in the information markets. 
Our study suggests that with the presence of limited attention, an information seller can tactically utilize 
free information to determine the intensity of competition he will face in the market of paid information. 
Our model also has the potential to infer the level of the attentional constraint of information seekers in an 
industry and the optimal amount of free and paid information that information sellers should provide. 
These insights speak directly to the businesses that critically depends on solving the question of “how much 
information to give away for free”, such as online newspapers (e.g., NYT), knowledge sharing and 
monetization platforms (e.g., Zhihu, Quora), digital music distribution services (e.g., TuneCore), etc. 
Reference 
Abaluck, J., and Adams, A. 2019. "What Do Consumers Consider before They Choose? Identification from 
Asymmetric Demand Responses." NBER Working Paper No. 23566. 
Anderson, S. P., and de Palma, A. 2012. "Competition for Attention in the Information (Overload) Age," 
Rand Journal of Economics (43:1), pp. 1-25. 
Bergemann, D., and Bonatti, A. 2018. "Markets for Information: An Introduction." SSRN. 
Bergemann, D., Bonatti, A., and Smolin, A. 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American 
Economic Review (108:1), pp. 1-48. 
 Information Selling with Limited Attention 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 9 
Berry, S., Levinsohn, J., and Pakes, A. 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society), pp. 841-890. 
Butters, G. R. 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," The Review of Economic 
Studies (44:3), pp. 465–491. 
Cannon, M. 2014. "Zuckerberg: Internet Should Be Free for Everyone," in: Tech Times. 
Cattaneo, M. D., Ma, X., Masatlioglu, Y., and Suleymanov, E. 2019. "A Random Attention Model." 
Chen, Y. X., and Yao, S. 2017. "Sequential Search with Refinement: Model and Application with Click-
Stream Data," Management Science (63:12), pp. 4345-4365. 
Cheng, H. K., and Liu, Y. 2012. "Optimal Software Free Trial Strategy: The Impact of Network Externalities 
and Consumer Uncertainty," Information Systems Research (23:2), pp. 488-504. 
Dubé, J.-P., Hitsch, G. J., and Manchanda, P. 2005. "An Empirical Model of Advertising Dynamics," 
Quantitative marketing and economics (3:2), pp. 107-144. 
Grossman, G. M., and Shapiro, C. 1984. "Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products," The 
Review of Economic Studies (51:1), pp. 63-81. 
Hörner, J., and Skrzypacz, A. 2016. "Selling Information," Journal of Political Economy (124:6), pp. 1515-
1562. 
Huang, Y. 2019. "Learning by Doing and the Demand for Advanced Products," Marketing Science (38:1). 
Iyer, G., and Katona, Z. 2015. "Competing for Attention in Social Communication Markets," Management 
Science (62:8), pp. 2304-2320. 
Kim, H., and Song, R. 2019. "Free-to-Paid Transition of Online Content Providers: An Empirical Analysis 
of U.S. Newspapers’ Paywall Rollout." Working Paper. 
Kim, J. B., Albuquerque, P., and Bronnenberg, B. J. 2010. "Online Demand under Limited Consumer 
Search," Marketing Science (29:6), pp. 1001-1023. 
Lacetera, N., Pope, D. G., and Sydnor, J. R. 2012. "Heuristic Thinking and Limited Attention in the Car 
Market," American Economic Review (102:5), pp. 2206-2236. 
Manzini, P., and Mariotti, M. 2014. "Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets," Econometrica (82:3), pp. 
1153-1176. 
Moses, L. 2018. "To Goose Subscriber Growth, the New York Times Plans to Try a Flexible Meter," in: 
Digiday UK. 
Niculescu, M. F., and Wu, D. J. 2014. "Economics of Free under Perpetual Licensing: Implications for the 
Software Industry," Information Systems Research (25:1), pp. 173-199. 
Oh, H., Animesh, A., and Pinsonneault, A. 2016. "Free Versus for-a-Fee: The Impact of a Paywall on the 
Pattern and Effectiveness of Word-of-Mouth Via Social Media," MIS Quarterly (40:1), p. 31. 
Pattabhiramaiah, A., Sriram, S., and Manchanda, P. 2019. "Paywalls: Monetizing Online Content," Journal 
of Marketing (83:2), pp. 19-36. 
Pauwels, K., and Weiss, A. 2008. "Moving from Free to Fee: How Online Firms Market to Change Their 
Business Model Successfully," Journal of Marketing (72:3), pp. 14-31. 
Peters, J. 2011. "The Times Announces Digital Subscription Plan," in: The New York Times. 
Shannon, C. 2001. "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and 
Communications Review (5:1), pp. 3-55. 
Smith, G. 2017. "N.Y. Times Scales Back Free Articles to Get More Subscribers," in: Bloomberg. Bloomberg. 
Stango, V., and Zinman, J. 2014. "Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the 
Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees," The Review of Financial Studies (27:4), pp. 990-1030. 
Terui, N., Ban, M., and Allenby, G. M. 2011. "The Effect of Media Advertising on Brand Consideration and 
Choice," Marketing Science (30:1), pp. 74-91. 
Weintraub, G. Y., Benkard, C. L., and Van Roy, B. 2008. "Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many 
Firms," Econometrica (76:6), pp. 1375-1411. 
